CF Debate

Absent Qualia / Zombie Argument

ConceivabilityPhenomenologyAnti-Physicalism

Overview

It's conceivable that two systems are functionally identical but one is conscious and the other isn't, e.g. we can imagine an identical replica of a given person that behaves the same but has no 'inner experience' corresponding to the kind of conscious self we normally experience (a 'p-zombie'). If so, there cannot be a functional grounding to consciousness and computational functionalism is false.

The argument is often applied via modal logic. An approximation is as follows: if something can be conceived it must be possible (even if not actual). As soon as zombies are possible (and might exist in some other universe even if not our own), that is sufficient metaphysical reason to require a theory of consciousness to be robust to it (since an explanation for consciousness should hold in all possible universes).

Responses

  1. If we restrict our interest to this universe, conceivability arguments might be invalid (they reflect our current ignorance about how this universe works, not some deeper truth). For instance, p-zombies might be conceivable in some other universe with different physical laws but not actually true in this universe, where physical laws define CF as the condition for consciousness. Where CF is being implemented, there will always be a relevant conscious experience.

  2. This argument attacks not just CF, but all functionalist theories of consciousness. If someone is already committed to functionalist approaches, then an optimistic agnostic response could say: "we're not sure what answer addresses zombie/conceivability arguments, but one must exist, and that answer should be presumed to support CF (as well as other functionalist positions) until shown otherwise)."

    BUT: This is a weak approach compared to committing to an answer and exploring its feasibility. Moreover, other physicalist theories might have different tools or more plausible claims, so this response is better seen as the start of a discussion than its end.

Further reading

  • Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2023). Zombies