CF Debate

Abstract Objects Problem / Intangibility of Thought

IntentionalityPhenomenologyMethodologyAnti-Physicalism

Overview

It seems that we can conceive of and discuss abstract objects (such as 'redness', 'squareness', 'liberty', 'anger') divorced from any specific physical instantiations of those objects. However, in a world where conscious experiences are generated purely by physical instantiations (such as computations running on a physical computer), how can there be any phenomena that are separate from physical instantiations (phenomenal explanandum)? How can we operate with abstract objects so securely, e.g. being confident that we mean the same thing when invoking the number '5' (utility explanandum)?

Responses

  1. Abstract objects can be generated within neural networks (artificial or biological) as informational constructs. They feel 'non-physical' and 'non-tangible' due to the structure of the network's sensory and cognition systems, not because they actually are 'non-physical' (in practice, they exist in the brain or in the computer).

    BUT: We need to forego the certainty that comes from everyone operating with the same abstract objects by virtue of some non-physical marker to define them, e.g. the 'utility explanandum' is something we approximate only.

  2. This argument attacks not just CF but also other non-computationalist physicalist views.

    BUT: Non-computationalist physicalist views may have specific tools to tackle this question unavailable to CF (e.g. tools based on substrate considerations).

Further reading