Causal Exclusion Arguments

Overview

These arguments typically have two main assumptions:
1. Physical closure, e.g. every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause at any given point in time. Another way of thinking about this is that the laws of physics account for all causal behaviour - or at least will account for all causal behaviour once complete. We end up with a set of equations that define how a system evolves, potentially including randomised elements.
2. No systematic overdetermination, e.g. effects are not routinely caused twice over by distinct sufficient causes.

The result is that any higher-level properties that emerge from physical causes or equations either (i) do no causal work (because it is fully captured in those equations) or (ii) collapse into the underlying physical objects that realise them. Functional/role or dispositional properties are examples of such higher level properties. If that is undesirable, we should relate consciousness to certain appropriate underlying physical objects.

Responses

Argue that causal overdeterminism is actually harmless. Maybe two things can cause the same outcome and each is equally valid, even if the outcome would have been the same without it.
Accept and be explicit that consciousness is epiphenomenal, i.e. makes no difference to physical reality.
Deny that the reductionist project of physics leads to causal closure. Accept and be explicit that a non-physicalist or strong emergence approach is needed to explain mental phenomena.

Overview

Responses

Further reading