Explanatory Gap
Overview
Even if we identify physical brain processes that correlate with conscious experience, we still lack an explanation of why or how those processes give rise to subjective experience. The incompleteness of our explanations points towards the possibility that there may be a fundamental gap between physical descriptions and phenomenal consciousness.
Responses
The Explanatory Gap effectively assumes the answer, i.e. it assumes that CF explanations are not just inadequate today but doomed to be inadequate forever. Even if the conclusion is fair, different arguments need to be used for it, because skepticism can be broadly applied to any aspect of knowledge/experience.
The Explanatory Gap applies equally to all theories of consciousness. Whatever explanation is provided - whether spiritual, dualist, physical, panpsychist - we can still ask why 'that' particular phenomenon should be conscious (or give rise to consciousness). Simply asserting that the newly invoked phenomenon is defined to do exactly that is at best a circular argument - at worst it feels ad hoc.
Further reading
- Chalmers D (2006). Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap
- Van Gulick R (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) (2025). 5.2 The Explanatory Gap
Do you find this argument strong or weak?