Problem of Many Minds
Overview
As a target CF algorithm executes on a digital computer, it does so on physical systems with 'large' components that span multiple particles (or, at least, components with spatial extension). If consciousness occurs when the algorithm completes its path through the system ('supervenes' on the system's physical behaviour), then the same algorithm can be traced through multiple 'narrow' physical pathways, each occurring on constituent particles or adjacent space-time points within each component. Each pathway meets the same criteria as the target CF algorithm does for the system as a whole, so each should individually give rise to an additional 'mind' that holds experience.
The implication is that any one conscious mind would be accompanied by many other identical ones, raising issues such as which one is responsible ("has causal agency") over the computation.
Responses
Accept multiple minds.
BUT: Each mind has the same feeling of conscious agency, yet the system is over-determined. Either one mind must be identified with the causality of the system itself, all minds must be seen as epiphenomenal, or a coherent notion of causal redundancy needs to be motivated within the CF framework.
Identify some rule that means only certain aggregate physical structures should be identified as 'units'.
BUT: This rule needs motivating so it can be assessed on its own merits. For instance, a counterfactual definition could be applied, but issues around counterfactual causality need addressing (e.g. counterfactual causal rules can be hard to define in cases such as two stones striking a window at the same time or separated by a fraction of a second).
Further reading
- Monton B & Goldberg S (2006). The problem of the many minds. Minds & Machines
- Roelofs L (2024). No Such Thing as Too Many Minds