CF Debate

Phenomenal Binding Problem

Key ArgumentPhenomenologyEpiphenomenalism

Overview

Conscious experiences seem to contain multiple pieces of integrated information at once (e.g. different colors, shapes, sensations), at least sometimes. Computations build up complex informational constructs (e.g. a matrix multiplication) from simple informational constructs (e.g. binary bits). But how can this exercise generate complex conscious contents with fundamentally integrated information within a single conscious entity, given that every step of the process focuses only on individual simple steps? CF algorithms are designed so that each 'step' of the algorithm can be considered in isolation of the whole algorithm, analysing only its immediate inputs and outputs. Likewise, any implementation of an algorithm in a digital computer reduces it to micro-processing steps which only have informational access to their individual inputs and outputs. The view of the 'algorithm as a whole' only exists in the conscious mind of an external observer.

Responses

  1. A complex entity emerges from the completion of the target CF algorithm.

    BUT: If so, such an entity would make no causal contribution to the operation of the system, which is designed to work entirely at the individual algorithm step or logic gate level. Such consciousness would be epiphenomenal within the usual CF framework of local causality and algorithm definition.

    2. If this consequence is accepted, CF can surpass the phenomenal binding problem, but should comment on whether human consciousness is also epiphenomenal and, if not, acknowledge this key distinction between CF-style consciousness and human-style consciousness. If human-style consciousness is epiphenomenal, we need some explanation as to why it appears that natural selection would have promoted consciousness and made it a major part of how we function as competitive, living systems (i.e. suggests consciousness has a fitness-relevant function in our evolutionary environment, which is impossible under epiphenomenalism). If the consequence is not accepted, some new definition of causality and algorithm needs to be introduced that explicitly moves beyond the CF framework.

Further reading