Phenomenal-Functional Correlational Evidence
Overview
What we feel seems to track various functional explanations and interventions. Such correlations are more plausible if consciousness is in fact identical with such functions.
For instance, with cochlear implants, when we implement the function (e.g. spectrotemporal analysis), users report recognisably auditory qualia that track functional resolution limits. As algorithms improve, phenomenology improves. Brain interventions in empirical neuroscience have identified parts of the brain, such as place cells, where phenomenology and function line up naturally.
Responses
The empirical evidence relates only to defining the contents of consciousness, not to the system that has the capability to experience those contents. Non-functionalists about mind do not deny that there are lots of functions involved in brain activity that shape what we experience, they deny that those functions account for the entire phenomenon of consciousness.
Do you find this argument strong or weak?