Simulation Hypothesis

Overview

Existing theories of physics are generally understood as being unable to rule out that our entire universe is being simulated at the fundamental physics level on a Turing-equivalent architecture (the simulation hypothesis). If our universe and everything within it (including human consciousness) were indeed the result of a simulation, then CF would necessarily be true. It is therefore not possible to rule out CF without also ruling out the simulation hypothesis.

Any theory of consciousness faces a trilemma where it must either 1) derive from a new understanding of physics which somehow rules out the simulation hypothesis, 2) appeal to something outside of physics to explain consciousness, or 3) be a CF theory.

As a result, we cannot rule out CF or propose non-CF theories 'on the cheap'. Potential avenues which non-CF advocates may appeal to, such as evidence indicating that consciousness relies on biological or physical phenomena which don't seem to lend themselves to digital computation, would in fact be perfectly compatible with CF, providing such findings don't involve new physics which opposes the simulation hypothesis or somehow indicate non-physical phenomena. A non-CF theorist therefore cannot hope to remain in line with conventional physics while rejecting CF. They must instead adopt a more radical position if they hope for consciousness to be explained.

Our thanks to Demian Till for developing this argument.

Responses

The simulation hypothesis is unlikely enough that it is reasonable to base a theory of consciousness on the assumption that the universe is not a simulation, even though we lack direct empirical proof today. For instance, arguments against the simulation hypothesis could leverage Occam's razor reasoning, lack of incentives to create our universe among hypothetical simulators with adequate resources or implausible ethical implications for such beings, or the seemingly infeasible amount of computational resources that could be required. There have also been attempts to disprove the simulation hypothesis formally (e.g. Faizal et al 2025), although these attempts have not yet established a firm consensus.
BUT: There is a reasonable debate about where the burden of proof should lie in the simulation argument. As soon as there is a reasonable chance (even if unlikely) that we are in a simulation, consciousness theorists may wish to be robust to the possibility, driving them towards a CF theory.
Given the awesome capabilities required to simulate our universe, it is likely that the technologies used by the simulators go beyond the digital computer architectures envisaged to be sufficient for consciousness under mainstream CF theories. The simulators' reality may also have its own physics with important additional capabilities. It is possible that those extra technologies or physics enable them to simulate our consciousness in a way that would not be possible under a purely digital computer instantiation built from within the simulation.
BUT: This response speculates about possible technology and physics capabilities but fails to identify specific capabilities and why they might matter. Example capabilities that can be identified today may seem unlikely.
The same empirical evidence and theory base of physics that fails to disprove the simulation hypothesis also fails to explicitly ground consciousness. Any physics-compatible theory - whether CF or non-CF - has to privilege some phenomenon within physics as creating, grounding, or necessarily correlating with consciousness. With multiple plausible phenomena, this assignment rule already represents something 'new' to current physics, so the distinction between CF as 'physics-friendly' and non-CF as 'physics-inconsistent' is overblown. See also other arguments that challenge mainstream CF theories as being inconsistent with physics, where they are process-based or emergentist.

Overview

Responses

Further reading