Anti-Physicalism
Contends that no wholly physical story (computational, biological, or otherwise) can in principle capture consciousness, meaning, or agency, although different types of physical story (e.g. functionalist vs intrinsic properties) potentially have access to different responses.
4 challenging
Challenging Arguments (4)
Abstract Objects Problem / Intangibility of Thought
How can abstract objects be separate from their physical instantiation?
Intentionality, Phenomenology, Methodology, Anti-Physicalism
Knowledge Arguments
Knowing all the physical facts about an experience (like seeing red) is not the same as having that experience.
Key Argument, Conceivability, Phenomenology, Anti-Physicalism
Absent Qualia / Zombie Argument
It seems possible for a being to be functionally identical to a person but have no inner experience.
Conceivability, Phenomenology, Anti-Physicalism
Inverted Spectrum Arguments
Two people could have different subjective experiences (e.g., seeing different colors) while being functionally identical.
Conceivability, Phenomenology, Anti-Physicalism