Conceivability
Leverages what is imaginable (zombies, inverted qualia, radical realisations) to argue that physical facts might be insufficient for phenomenal facts.
Supporting Arguments (2)
Fading Qualia
If you slowly replaced your neurons with functionally equivalent chips, your consciousness would fade but you wouldn't be able to report it.
Dancing Qualia
If your neurons were rapidly swapped with functionally equivalent chips that don't support qualia, you would not be able to report the "dance".
Challenging Arguments (5)
Knowledge Arguments
Knowing all the physical facts about an experience (like seeing red) is not the same as having that experience.
Fractional / Borderline Qualia
Inexact computation could result in incomplete or "fractional" states of consciousness.
Absent Qualia / Zombie Argument
It seems possible for a being to be functionally identical to a person but have no inner experience.
Inverted Spectrum Arguments
Two people could have different subjective experiences (e.g., seeing different colors) while being functionally identical.
Proper Influences
Computational functionalism holds that consciousness is a matter of implementing the right algorithm