Methodology

Turns the lens on how the debate itself is framed: burdens of proof, appropriate definitions, explanatory standards, and what counts as a satisfactory explanation.

7 supporting6 challenging

Supporting Arguments (7)

Church Turing Thesis

Most natural processes are computable, so it's likely consciousness is too.

Key Argument, Methodology, Substrate, Behavioural, Ontology, Computational

Cognitive Science & AI Success Argument

Computational models have been very successful at reproducing cognition, so they will eventually reproduce phenomenal consciousness too.

Behavioural, Methodology, Computational

Multiple Realisability Argument

Since different brains can have the same mental state (e.g., pain), what must matter is the functional pattern, not the physical material.

Key Argument, Substrate, Phenomenology, Methodology

Natural Selection Argument

Evolution would not select for consciousness if it didn't have a useful function.

Behavioural, Methodology, Ontology

Anti-Mystery / Pro-Parsimony Debate

A scientific, functional explanation is simpler and thus preferable to one that invokes the mystery of qualia.

Methodology, Behavioural

Ontic Structural Realism

If reality is fundamentally just a set of relationships, then consciousness is also defined by its relational (and thus functional) structure.

Methodology, Epiphenomenalism, Ontology, Computational

Informational Ontologies

If reality is fundamentally made of information, then consciousness is a form of (substrate independent) information processing.

Methodology, Epiphenomenalism, Ontology, Computational

Challenging Arguments (6)

Individuation Problem

Identifying which algorithm a system is running is an arbitrary, observer-dependent choice.

Identity, Methodology, Epiphenomenalism

Simulation Equivalence Argument

Simulating a thing (like weather) is not the same as instantiating it physically.

Substrate, Methodology, Computational

Abstract Objects Problem / Intangibility of Thought

How can abstract objects be separate from their physical instantiation?

Intentionality, Phenomenology, Methodology, Anti-Physicalism

Explanatory Gap

Even if we identify physical brain processes that correlate with conscious experience, we still lack an explanation of why or how those processes give rise to subjective experience

Phenomenology, Methodology

The Hard Problem is often framed as a question: why should a given function be accompanied by experience? 'Experience' and 'function' are (conceivably) different kinds of phenomenon, so no explanation for the latter can ever bridge the gap to the former on its own merits

Phenomenology, Methodology

Functional Definition Circularity

Functionalists argue that a mental state like pain does not feel 'painful' in virtue of its intrinsic nature but because of the relationships between that mental state and other mental states

Methodology