Phenomenology

Focuses on the qualitative feel of experience ("what-it-is-like") and asks how the system would account for or implement necessary aspects of that qualitative feel.

4 supporting10 challenging

Supporting Arguments (4)

Fading Qualia

If you slowly replaced your neurons with functionally equivalent chips, your consciousness would fade but you wouldn't be able to report it.

Key Argument, Conceivability, Substrate, Phenomenology, Promotes functionalism

Dancing Qualia

If your neurons were rapidly swapped with functionally equivalent chips that don't support qualia, you would not be able to report the "dance".

Conceivability, Substrate, Phenomenology, Promotes functionalism

Multiple Realisability Argument

Since different brains can have the same mental state (e.g., pain), what must matter is the functional pattern, not the physical material.

Key Argument, Substrate, Phenomenology, Methodology, Promotes all CF

Introspection of Functions

When we look inward, we only observe the functional roles of our mental states, and never "non-functional" qualia.

Phenomenology, Behavioural, Intentionality, Promotes functionalism

Challenging Arguments (10)

Phenomenal Binding Problem

How do CF algorithms give rise to ontologically unified moments of experience?

Key Argument, Phenomenology, Epiphenomenalism, Targets digital CF

Staccato Consciousness Problem

Would computational consciousness just be a series of disconnected moments?

Phenomenology, Identity, Epiphenomenalism, Targets all CF

Dual Experience Ambiguity

The same system could run slightly different computations, creating ambiguous or multiple experiences.

Identity, Phenomenology, Targets all CF

Abstract Objects Problem / Intangibility of Thought

How can abstract objects be separate from their physical instantiation?

Intentionality, Phenomenology, Methodology, Targets physicalism

Knowledge Arguments

Knowing all the physical facts about an experience (like seeing red) is not the same as having that experience.

Key Argument, Conceivability, Phenomenology, Targets physicalism

Fractional / Borderline Qualia

Inexact computation could result in incomplete or "fractional" states of consciousness.

Conceivability, Phenomenology, Computational, Targets all CF

Absent Qualia / Zombie Argument

It seems possible for a being to be functionally identical to a person but have no inner experience.

Conceivability, Phenomenology, Targets functionalism

Inverted Spectrum Arguments

Two people could have different subjective experiences (e.g., seeing different colors) while being functionally identical.

Conceivability, Phenomenology, Targets functionalism

Explanatory Gap

Identifying neural correlates doesn't explain why or how physical processes give rise to subjective experience.

Phenomenology, Methodology, Targets all theories

The Hard Problem

Why should any physical function (or anything else) be accompanied by experience at all?

Phenomenology, Methodology, Targets all theories