Phenomenology
Focuses on the qualitative feel of experience ("what-it-is-like") and asks how the system would account for or implement necessary aspects of that qualitative feel.
Supporting Arguments (4)
Fading Qualia
If you slowly replaced your neurons with functionally equivalent chips, your consciousness would fade but you wouldn't be able to report it.
Dancing Qualia
If your neurons were rapidly swapped with functionally equivalent chips that don't support qualia, you would not be able to report the "dance".
Multiple Realisability Argument
Since different brains can have the same mental state (e.g., pain), what must matter is the functional pattern, not the physical material.
Introspection of Functions
When we look inward, we only observe the functional roles of our mental states, and never "non-functional" qualia.
Challenging Arguments (10)
Phenomenal Binding Problem
How do CF algorithms give rise to ontologically unified moments of experience?
Staccato Consciousness Problem
Would computational consciousness just be a series of disconnected moments?
Dual Experience Ambiguity
The same system could run slightly different computations, creating ambiguous or multiple experiences.
Abstract Objects Problem / Intangibility of Thought
How can abstract objects be separate from their physical instantiation?
Knowledge Arguments
Knowing all the physical facts about an experience (like seeing red) is not the same as having that experience.
Fractional / Borderline Qualia
Inexact computation could result in incomplete or "fractional" states of consciousness.
Absent Qualia / Zombie Argument
It seems possible for a being to be functionally identical to a person but have no inner experience.
Inverted Spectrum Arguments
Two people could have different subjective experiences (e.g., seeing different colors) while being functionally identical.
Explanatory Gap
Even if we identify physical brain processes that correlate with conscious experience, we still lack an explanation of why or how those processes give rise to subjective experience
The Hard Problem
The Hard Problem is often framed as a question: why should a given function be accompanied by experience? 'Experience' and 'function' are (conceivably) different kinds of phenomenon, so no explanation for the latter can ever bridge the gap to the former on its own merits