Challenging Arguments
These arguments challenge the idea that consciousness can arise from computational processes alone.
Phenomenal Binding Problem
How do CF algorithms give rise to ontologically unified moments of experience?
Staccato Consciousness Problem
Would computational consciousness just be a series of disconnected moments?
Chinese Room Argument
A system can perfectly mimic understanding without being conscious.
US Economy Argument
Under CF, any sufficiently complex system, like an economy, could be conscious, however abstract.
Leibniz's Mill / Chinese Nation
If a conscious machine were huge, you would only see its parts, not a mind.
Problem of Many Minds
Sub-algorithms of a CF algorithm may constitute independent minds themselves.
Slicing Problem
A trivial physical operation on a 3D Turing machine could theoretically multiply the number of minds at no cost.
Individuation Problem
Identifying which algorithm a system is running is an arbitrary, observer-dependent choice.
Dual Experience Ambiguity
The same system could run slightly different computations, creating ambiguous or multiple experiences.
Lightcone Reification Problem
If the last step of an algorithm cannot know the full history of its inputs, those inputs cannot causally affect the current moment.
Simulation Equivalence Argument
Simulating a thing (like weather) is not the same as instantiating it physically.
Free Will Argument
Deterministic computation seems incompatible with the experience of free will.
Abstract Objects Problem / Intangibility of Thought
How can abstract objects be separate from their physical instantiation?
Intentionality Problem
Computers manipulate symbols without understanding their meaning.
Possibility of Analogue Computation
Consciousness might depend on continuous (analogue) processes, not discrete (digital) ones.
Embodiment Requirements
Consciousness may require a physical body that interacts with the world.
Knowledge Arguments
Knowing all the physical facts about an experience (like seeing red) is not the same as having that experience.
Fractional / Borderline Qualia
Inexact computation could result in incomplete or "fractional" states of consciousness.
Absent Qualia / Zombie Argument
It seems possible for a being to be functionally identical to a person but have no inner experience.
Inverted Spectrum Arguments
Two people could have different subjective experiences (e.g., seeing different colors) while being functionally identical.
Unfolding Problem
Any recurrent neural network can be made feedforward-only, conflicting with evidence of recurrency and self-reference in humans.
Pen & Paper Argument
The algorithm that is conscious in a computer can, by CF assumption, be replicated in all relevant aspects of its function by writing it out by hand on pen and paper, e
Explanatory Gap
Even if we identify physical brain processes that correlate with conscious experience, we still lack an explanation of why or how those processes give rise to subjective experience
The Hard Problem
The Hard Problem is often framed as a question: why should a given function be accompanied by experience? 'Experience' and 'function' are (conceivably) different kinds of phenomenon, so no explanation for the latter can ever bridge the gap to the former on its own merits
Functional Definition Circularity
Functionalists argue that a mental state like pain does not feel 'painful' in virtue of its intrinsic nature but because of the relationships between that mental state and other mental states
Counterfactual Computation Critique
Computation is typically defined in terms of counterfactuals – what a system would do with different inputs is an important part of its causal structure
Neural Replay
It is plausible the brain operates based on what does happen rather than what could have happened, unlike computation which is typically defined via counterfactuals